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1.	Allow me to co-opt the term “like” and its derivatives for technical philosophical purposes.  To wit:

2.	A likes X if and only if A finds the promotion or realization of X to be, ceteris paribus, sufficient ground for choosing one option rather than another.

3.	Nothing other than a like can provide a ground for choice, because by definition likes include anything that can provide such a ground.  

4.	There is no rational basis for imputing a person’s likes.  It is a purely empirical matter whether and when a person finds something to be thus choice-affecting.  

5.	Since what is liked is an empirical matter, in principle anything might be liked.

6.	Oneself, or others, or no one, or everyone altogether may be included in the object of one’s likes.  One may like the rationality of truth and coherence.  One may like morality, even its independence from whether one likes it.

7.	Likes are not restricted to contemporaneous objects.  You don’t have to be thirsty right now to dislike thirst whenever it might occur. 

8.	Persons can be mistaken about their likes.  You can motivate a person to do something simply by having them come to believe it is likeable.

9.	Likes represent values.  Likes constitute facts about what people find valuable enough to affect what they choose and do.  Any values that can make a difference in a person’s choices are by that fact likes.  

10.	Likes are themselves reasons qua grounds for choosing one thing rather than another.  You don’t need an additional reason to fulfill a like – thankfully, because otherwise you’d be launched on an infinite regress. 

11.	Likes are essential for rational choice:  one cannot rationally select among multiple options without some ground for that selection, i.e. some like.  

12.	Whether to rationally deliberate is itself a choice; it is something we do, not something that is done to us.  Engaging in rational deliberation presupposes liking rational deliberation, either in itself or as a means to likeable consequences.   

13.	There is little that has been said above regarding “likes” that a proper, card-carrying Humean could not say about “desires”.

14.	Insofar as likes (desires) determine whatever we choose, and likes (desires) determine whether we engage in rational deliberation at all:  reason is the slave of the passions.

